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Abstract 
This paper provides new insights about the existence of expansionary fiscal consolidations in 
the Economic and Monetary Union, using annual panel data for 14 European Union countries 
over the period 1970-2012. Different measures for assessing fiscal consolidations based on 
the changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance were calculated. A similar ad-hoc 
approach was used to compute monetary expansions, in order to include them in the 
assessment of non-Keynesian effects for different budgetary components. Panel Fixed Effects 
estimations for private consumption show that, in some cases, when fiscal consolidations are 
coupled with monetary expansions, the traditional Keynesian signals are reversed in the cases 
of general government final consumption expenditure, social transfers and taxes. Keynesian 
effects prevail when fiscal consolidations are not matched by monetary easing. Panel probit 
estimations suggest that longer and expenditure-based consolidations contribute positively for 
its success, whilst the opposite is the case for tax-based ones.  
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1. Introduction 
Keynesian theory gives us some insights into the expected effect of government 
budgetary components’ changes on income. It postulates that an increase in government 
spending should stimulate the economy, via the multiplier mechanism, thus increasing 
disposable income and private consumption. Based on this reasoning, an increase in taxation 
should lead to a decrease in private consumption. 
Nevertheless, since the early 90’s, having studied the case studies of Denmark and 
Ireland
1
, some literature has been discussing the possible non-Keynesian effects of fiscal 
policy, especially during fiscal consolidation periods. 
The theoretical underpinnings stemmed from the German Council of Economic 
experts in their reports of 1981 and 1982, and are referred to as the “expectational view of 
fiscal policy”.2 Arguably, the standard Keynesian relationship between private consumption 
and government budgetary components may be reversed under certain circumstances. A 
deterioration of the fiscal position today (resulting in a budget deficit), may lead to an 
increase in taxation in the future, in order to comply with the government budget constraint, 
therefore reducing agents’ permanent income. If such expectations are accepted by 
individuals, then this could lead to a decrease in private consumption today. The reverse 
reasoning is the case for fiscal consolidation, whereby an improvement in the fiscal position 
may lead to an increase in private consumption today. Some empirical research presents 
evidence that supports this view.
3
 
The expectational view of fiscal policy relies on the assumption of Ricardian 
households, which have a smoothing effect on consumption and do not have liquidity 
constraints. This motivates a thorough assessment of monetary developments when 
expansionary fiscal consolidations are being studied. Moreover, according to the Keynesian 
view, under the IS-LM framework, a fiscal consolidation may lead to an increase in private 
consumption, if it is accompanied by a strong enough monetary expansion that offsets the 
detrimental effects of fiscal policy developments on disposable income and private 
consumption.  
                                                 
1
 See Giavazzi & Pagano (1990). 
2
 See Hellwig & Newmann (1987). 
3
See for instance, Giavazzi & Pagano (1990), Perroti (1999), Ardagna (2004), Afonso (2006, 2010) and Alesina 
& Ardagna (2013). 
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Arguably, while neglecting the monetary policy stance, one could find themselves in a 
situation described by Ardagna (2004): “In this case, the coefficients of fiscal policy variables 
can be biased, capturing the effect of monetary, rather than fiscal policy”.  
The importance of this issue within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) context 
is fairly obvious, since the expectational view of fiscal policy was to some extent reflected in 
the fiscal convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty. Additionally, the monetary policy 
stance is outside the national governments’ sphere of influence.  
This paper contributes to existing literature by providing some new insights about the 
importance of the monetary stance for the relationship between fiscal developments and 
private consumption during fiscal consolidation periods. It does so by notably expanding 
Afonso’s (2006, 2010) and Afonso & Jalles’s (2014) core specification, in order to take into 
account monetary policy developments. We conduct an assessment of the fiscal episodes, 
using the same criteria. However, and in addition, we also identify monetary episodes for 14 
European Union countries from 1970 to 2012, and study their relationship with fiscal 
developments. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section two presents the review of the main related 
literature. Section three presents an identification of the fiscal and monetary episodes and 
their respective relationship. In section four, we conduct an empirical analysis of 
expansionary fiscal consolidations for the EMU, resorting to panel estimations, taking into 
account the developments of monetary policy, followed by a discussion of the results. We 
also assess, relying on a probit estimation, the factors that may impinge on the success of the 
fiscal consolidations, namely expenditure based versus revenue based consolidations, using 
the fiscal and monetary episodes identified in the earlier sections. Section five concludes with 
some final remarks and points out some possible subjects for future research on this topic.    
        
2. Literature 
Hellwig & Neumann (1987) were pioneers with regard to the postulation of the 
expansionary fiscal consolidation hypothesis. They argue that fiscal consolidation in Germany 
in the 1980’s under Chancellor Kohl had such a positive impact on private sector confidence 
that demand actually increased. Supposedly, fiscal consolidation by the Federal Government 
and monetary tightness by the Bundesbank led to continued growth of output and low 
inflation. Also lower deficits stimulated private investment in the long run, due to reduced 
cost of financing. Nevertheless, unemployment remained high, which authors attribute to 
labour market rigidity. 
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Giavazzi & Pagano (1990) test this hypothesis for Denmark and Ireland for the mid 
and late 1980's, respectively. For Denmark, they report that the thriving consumption 
experienced in 1983-1986 cannot be explained by the decline in interest rates alone, and that 
such an occurrence is related to fiscal consolidation through the increase in revenue from 
income taxation and the decrease in public investment. Regarding the Irish case, the fast 
growth of consumption during the second stabilization was due to the government’s focus on 
decreasing spending, instead of increasing taxation, and also due to the liberalisation of the 
credit markets. In these cases, as a whole, expansionary fiscal consolidation is linked to an 
adjustment on the side of public spending, rather than on revenues, although in Denmark, the 
adjustment was through investment spending and in Ireland, it was through current spending. 
Alesina & Ardagna (1998) investigate the expansionary fiscal consolidation 
possibility, using an analysis of OECD countries from 1960 to 1994. According to the 
General Council of Economic Experts’ expectational view of fiscal policy addressed in 
Hellwig and Neumann (1987), fiscal adjustments that occur when the debt level is high, or 
growing rapidly, should be expansionary, whereas others should not. Nevertheless the authors 
don’t find evidence that confirms this view. On the other hand, they found strong evidence of 
the effect of the composition of the adjustment in the outcome of fiscal consolidation:  all of 
the non-expansionary adjustments were tax-based and all of the expansionary ones were 
based on expenditure cuts. Expenditure adjustments that were accompanied by wage 
moderation and by nominal exchange rate devaluation, turned out to be expansionary. 
Perroti (1999) addresses the same issue for nineteen OECD countries from 1965 to 
1994, and, according to his findings, substantial deficit cuts can lead to booms in private 
consumption. The likelihood of an expansionary fiscal consolidation increases in times of 
“fiscal stress”, which the author defines as periods of high debt-to-GDP ratio or following 
periods of exceptionally high debt-accumulation rates. His findings differ for other periods, as 
in “normal” times, the Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidation on private consumption 
predominate (either through spending cuts, or tax increases).  
Giavazzi et al. (2000) address the issue of expansionary fiscal consolidation in OECD 
countries from 1973 to 1996, and in developing countries from 1960 to 1995. In OECD 
countries, evidence of non-Keynesian response by the private sector is more likely to be 
found when fiscal impulses are large and persistent. This means that only those impulses can 
signal a regime change, which thus affects private sector expectations. Also non-Keynesian 
effects leading to expansionary fiscal consolidation, are stronger in the case of changes in net 
taxes, rather than changes in public expenditure. In developing countries, non-Keynesian 
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effects occur not only during periods of fiscal contractions, but also during fiscal expansions, 
and when countries are accumulating debt rapidly, regardless of its level.  
Using panel data from OECD countries from 1970 to 2002, Ardagna (2004) 
investigates the effect of fiscal consolidations on debt-to-GDP ratio and GDP growth. 
Regarding debt-to-GDP ratio, the success of fiscal consolidation depends more on the size of 
the adjustment, rather than its composition. On the other hand, the likelihood of fiscal 
consolidation being expansionary, increases when it is based on public spending cuts, rather 
than on increased taxation. Concerning the role of monetary policy, there was evidence that 
neither successful (leading to decrease in debt-to-GDP ratio), or expansionary (leading to 
increase in GDP growth) consolidations, need to be met by expansionary monetary policies, 
nor by exchange rate devaluations. 
Giudice et al. (2004) address the matter of non-Keynesian effects in fourteen 
European Union countries, in an ex-post and ex-ante analysis. Ex-post analysis consisted on 
studying the period from 1970 to 2002 to see whether fiscal consolidation episodes were 
followed by an increase in GDP growth. Results show that this occurred in about half the 
cases. The ex-ante analysis carried out was based on simulations by the European 
Commission QUEST model and suggested that short-term non-Keynesian effects can occur, if 
consolidation is mainly on the spending side. The latter is also true in the ex-post case, which 
is in line with most empirical studies. 
Afonso (2006, 2010) conducted a panel analysis for 15 EU countries from 1970 to 
2005, having found some evidence of non-Keynesian effects in private consumption for some 
government spending items, namely final consumption and social transfers. Results show that 
a decrease in government consumption leads to an increase in private consumption in the long 
run, and the magnitude of this effect is higher when a fiscal consolidation episode occurs.  
Devries et al. (2011) construct a database for fiscal consolidation measures taken by 
17 OECD countries from 1978 to 2009, based on the premise that computing fiscal 
consolidations from changes of the cyclically adjusted primary balance may be problematic. 
Arguably, such an approach may be biased, in the sense that it may capture changes that are 
not related to policy actions due to its inability to remove sharp fluctuations in economic 
activity. Therefore, they identify fiscal consolidations through an historical approach, based 
on policy documents. This database has been widely used in subsequent literature that 
concerns expansionary fiscal consolidations.
4
 
                                                 
4
 See, for instance, Afonso & Jalles (2012) and Alesina & Ardagna (2013).  
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Erceg & Lindé (2012) use a New Keynesian DSGE model to assess the differences of 
fiscal consolidation effects in an open economy for countries with an independent monetary 
policy vis-à-vis a currency union. If inflation is fairly sensitive to the output gap the output 
contracts more deeply in countries with an independent monetary policy. On the other hand, 
for a flatter Phillips Curve, the output contraction tends to be smaller in the independent 
monetary policy case, reflecting a real exchange rate depreciation even if the monetary policy 
is constrained by the zero lower bound. 
Afonso & Jalles (2012) analyse a panel of OECD countries from 1970 to 2010, to 
assess whether the composition and duration of fiscal consolidations contribute to their 
success. Consolidation episodes lead to a decrease in debt ratios, only if they are accompanied 
by strong economic growth and an increased output gap. Increased duration contributes to the 
success of the fiscal consolidation episode. Fiscal consolidation success depends on the 
composition of the adjustment: consolidations based mainly on tax increases, contribute 
negatively to its success. 
Alesina & Ardagna (2013) use a Devries et al. (2011) policy action-based approach to 
identify the fiscal episodes for 21 OECD countries from 1970 to 2010. They conclude that 
expenditure based adjustments are more likely to be successful and expansionary. Monetary 
policy is not significant for explaining the differences between expenditure-based and tax-
based adjustments.      
On the other hand, Erceg & Lindé (2013) conducted an assessment based on a two 
country DSGE model and their findings favour tax-based consolidations within a currency 
union, since those have smaller adverse effects on output than the expenditure-based ones, at 
least in the short-term. Expenditure-based consolidations seem counterproductive in the short-
term if the monetary policy is near the zero lower bound. 
To sum up, most of the research seems to support, or at least not to reject, the idea of 
expansionary fiscal episodes.
5
 Also, some findings
6
 suggest that expansionary and successful 
fiscal episodes are more likely when there is consolidation on the spending side.  
Moreover, some of the literature, such as Perroti (1999) and Giavazzi et al. (2000) 
propose that non-Keynesian effects are more likely to, or only occur, during periods of high 
debt-to-GDP ratio or when debt is accumulating quickly.  
 
                                                 
5
 As seen in Giavazzi & Pagano (1990), Alesina & Ardagna (1998), Perroti (1999), Giavazzi et al. (2000), van 
Aarle & Garretsen (2003), Ardagna (2004), Giudice et al. (2004) and Afonso (2006, 2010). 
6
 Giavazzi & Pagano (1990), Alesina & Ardagna (1998), Afonso (2006, 2010) and Alesina & Ardagana (2013). 
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3. Identification of fiscal and monetary episodes in the EMU 
3.1. Fiscal Episodes 
Most of the empirical literature relies on the change in the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance (CAPB) as a percentage of GDP, as measure of governments’ structural budget 
balance. It extracts those elements of the primary balance that are due to the business cycle, 
from the total balance, in order to obtain an indicator that has been corrected for the effects of 
changes in economic activity, and that thus reflects the discretionary part of the fiscal policy. 
Table XI in the Appendix shows some descriptive statistics of this indicator. 
One can assess the existence of fiscal episodes – either contractions or expansions – by 
studying the behaviour of this indicator over time. In Giavazzi & Pagano (1996), a fiscal 
episode occurs when the cumulative change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance is at 
least 5, 4, or 3 percentage points of GDP in 4, 3 or 2 years respectively, or 3 percentage points 
in one year. Alesina & Ardagna (1998) identify the periods of occurrence of fiscal episodes 
by looking for the periods when the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance was 
greater than 2 percentage points in one year, or at least 1.5 percentage points of GDP on 
average in the last two years. Afonso’s (2006, 2010) assessment of fiscal episodes relies on a 
different method: a fiscal episode occurs when the change in the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance is greater than 1.5 times the panel standard deviation of this indicator, or when the 
average absolute change in the last two years is greater than the standard deviation of the full 
panel. Table I shows the fiscal expansions and contractions according to the different criteria.
7
  
The measures used by Giavazzi & Pagano (1996), Alesina & Ardagna (1998) and 
Afonso (2006, 2010), were labelled respectively as 1FE , 2FE  and 3FE . Overall, there is a 
considerable overlapping of episodes according to the different criteria:- there is a 
coincidence of 82 and 63 percent between fiscal episodes 1 and 2 and 1 and 3, respectively 
and 82 percent between criteria 2 and 3 (see Table I). The highest number of episodes is given 
by the criteria used by Alesina & Ardagna (1998), although the methodology followed by 
Giavazzi & Pagano (1996) leads to higher duration in both expansions and contractions.  
All the criteria reflect the cases studied by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), as fiscal 
contractions in Denmark in 1983-86 and in Ireland in 1988 were identified. Also, there is a 
clear identification of fiscal expansions in 2009 across the EMU countries, which followed 
the European Commission policy recommendations after the 2007-08 financial crisis. 
Furthermore, the different methodologies also identify the consolidation efforts made by those 
                                                 
7
 We used a slightly lower threshold for the Afonso (2006, 2010) methodology, due to the increase in the 
standard deviation of the panel sample from 1.57 to 2.00. We used 1, instead of 1.5 times the standard deviation. 
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countries that were subject to financial assistance in 2011-2012, namely Ireland, Greece and 
Portugal. 
 
Table I - Identification of fiscal episodes according to different criteria 
(1970-2012) 
 1FE  2FE  3FE  
 Country Expansions Contractions Expansions Contractions Expansions Contractions 
Austria  04 97 04 84, 97, 01, 05 04 84, 97, 01, 05 
Belgium  81, 05, 09 82-87 81, 05, 09  82-85, 06 81, 05, 09 82, 84-85, 06 
Denmark 75-76, 
 90-91 
83-87 75, 82,90 83-86 75, 82, 90 83-86 
Finland  79-80, 83, 
91-93, 10 
76-77,  
97-98, 00-01 
78,87, 91, 
09 
76-77, 81, 
88, 96-97, 
00-01 
78, 87, 91-92, 
10 
76, 88, 96, 00 
France      09   09   
Germany  75, 91, 95, 
01-02 
96-99, 12 75, 90-91, 
95, 01, 10 
96-97, 00, 
11-12 
75, 90-91, 95, 
01-02, 10 
96-97, 00, 11 
Greece  04, 08-09 92-94, 96, 
10-12 
89, 95,  
08-09 
91-92, 94, 
10-12 
89, 95, 08-09 91-92, 94, 10-
12 
Ireland  01-02, 
 07-11 
88, 11-12 95, 01,  
07-10 
88, 11-12 95, 01-02,  
07-10 
88, 11-12 
Italy    83, 92-94, 12 81, 01 82-83,  
92-93, 12 
81, 01 82-83, 92-93, 
12 
Netherlands  02, 09-10 91, 93 01, 09 91, 93, 96 01, 09 91, 93, 96 
Portugal  78-80, 94, 
09-10 
83-84, 11-12 78-79, 85, 
93, 05, 09 
83-84, 86, 
88, 92, 11-12 
78, 85, 93, 
05, 09-10 
83, 86, 88, 92, 
11-12 
Spain  08-11   08-09   08-09   
Sweden 02-03 96-99 02 96-97 02 96-97 
United 
Kingdom 
91-93,  
01-04, 09 
97-00, 11-12 90, 92,  
01-02, 09 
97-98, 00, 
11-12  
90, 92-93,  
01-03, 09 
00, 11 
# Years 
with 
episodes 
53 55 62 57 51 46 
Average 
duration of 
episodes 
(years) 
1.89 2.39 1.63 1.63 1.34 1.35 
 
 
 
Recent studies, such as Afonso & Jalles (2012) and Alesina & Ardagna (2013), also 
include a criterion for identifying fiscal consolidations referred to as IMF’s “Action Based 
Approach”, which was computed by Devries et al. (2011). It identifies fiscal consolidations 
based, not on the changes in CAPB, but on an historical approach through the analysis of 
policy documents. Arguably CAPB-based fiscal consolidations may be biased, in the sense 
that they may capture changes that are not related to policy actions due to their inability to 
remove sharp fluctuations in economic activity. Unfortunately, the database is still not up-to-
Source: Author’s computations. Notes: 1FE - Measure based on Giavazzi & Pagano (1996); 2FE - Measure 
based on Alesina & Ardagna (1998); 3FE - Measure based on Afonso (2006, 2010). 
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date so we would have to discard the most recent years (2010-2012) in order to use that 
approach. Therefore, we will not include it at this point, but we intend to do so in future 
research. 
 
3.2. Monetary episodes 
One of the main points in this paper is the study of the coupling of fiscal and monetary 
policy, in order to assess whether monetary expansions have an impact on the relationship 
between government budgetary components and private consumption during fiscal 
consolidation episodes. Therefore, it is crucial to establish a clear identification of the 
monetary episodes in the EMU countries. We chose three indicators that could be used as a 
measure of the monetary stance for the different countries, namely: the real short term money 
market interest rate, and the nominal and real effective exchange rates. 
The change in the real short term interest rate is a widely used measure of monetary 
policy easing or tightening
8
, as it accounts not only for money market rates, but also for price 
developments. Therefore, a negative variation in this indicator signals a real monetary easing, 
rather than a nominal one.
9
  
Both the nominal and the real effective exchange rate assess the currency value in a 
country vis-à-vis a weighted average of other selected countries’ currencies, which is 
commonly used to assess a country’s competitiveness. The nominal effective exchange rate 
has been used by Ardagna (2004) as an indicator of the monetary stance. A negative change 
in this indicator corresponds to currency depreciation and therefore monetary expansion. We 
also included the real effective exchange rate, with the purpose of accounting for possible 
differences in monetary episodes-identification due to price developments, which links to the 
arguments presented about the interest rates case. 
In order to define monetary episodes, we relied on a similar strategy as Afonso (2006, 
2010) and identified an episode when the absolute change in one year, or the average change 
in two years, in the different indicators was greater than 1.5 times, or 1 times the panel 
standard deviation respectively: 
                                                 
8
 See, for instance, Afonso & Sousa (2011). 
9
 Since nominal short-term interest rates are very similar in the EMU countries from 1999 onwards, we cannot 
include them in our estimations, due to near singular matrix issues and therefore they were excluded from this 
analysis. 
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  

   
  



. (1) 
             
l
tME denotes a monetary episode in period t, according to criterion l and 
l
tM
corresponds to the change of indicator l in period t. For real short term interest rate, we have 
an absolute change, whilst for the nominal and real effective exchange rates, we used the 
percentage change of the respective indexes.    stands for the panel standard deviation of the 
relevant indicator.      
Table II shows the monetary episodes identified according to the different indicators.
1ME , 2ME and 3ME correspond to the use of the methodology across the changes in the real 
short term interest rate, and the percent changes in the real and nominal effective exchange 
rate, respectively.  
One of the main findings, is that there are considerably more monetary episodes than 
fiscal ones. The duration of monetary episodes also changes significantly across the different 
criteria. If we look at the monetary episodes based on the change in the real short term interest 
rate ( 1ME ), it is possible to see that the expansions and contractions last 1.5 and 1.8 years on 
average, respectively. If we consider the changes in the nominal effective exchange rates, then 
the duration of expansions more than doubles, and in the case of contractions, it also increases 
significantly. 
Moreover, while in the case of fiscal episodes, there is significant overlapping across 
the different criteria, in this case it is much lower, with the matching being only 38, 51 and 63 
percent between 1ME  and 2ME , 1ME  and 3ME  and 2ME  and 3ME , respectively. The 
splitting between expansions and contractions is fairly even, with the exception of 3ME , 
which registered considerably more contractions than expansions. Also, we can see that there 
are episodes labelled as expansions in 1ME  that show up as contractions in 2ME  and 3ME , 
which further motivates the inclusion and analysis of all the different criteria.
10
  
The descriptive statistics of the indicators used to identify both fiscal and monetary 
episodes can be consulted in table XI in the Appendix. 
 
                                                 
10
 For instance, in Austria, monetary expansion in 1983 expansion is shown according to 1ME , but it shows up as 
a contraction in 3ME . 
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Table II – Identification of monetary episodes according to different criteria 
(1970-2012) 
 1ME  2ME  3ME  
Country Expansions Contractions Expansions Contractions Expansions Contractions 
Austria 72, 83, 94, 
09-10 
77, 80-81, 
89-90 
97-98, 00 77, 80, 87, 
93, 95, 04 
 73-80, 83, 86-
88, 93, 95 
Belgium 72,75, 
 82-83,  
93-94, 10 
76-77, 79-81, 
90-91 
81-83,  
97-98, 00 
77, 79, 86-87, 
95, 03-04 
81-83, 97 77-78,  
86-87, 91, 95, 
03-04 
Denmark 73, 81,  
94-97, 10 
76-78, 90-91, 
93, 07, 11 
80-82, 00 79, 86-87,  
03-04, 09 
80-82, 00 73-74, 76, 86-
87,  
90-91, 93, 95, 
03-04 
Finland 71-74, 88, 
93-95, 98, 
12 
75-76, 80,  
83-84, 89-92 
72, 78-79, 
92-94, 97, 
00, 11 
74-76, 80-82, 
85, 89-90,  
95-96, 03-04 
72-73,  
78-79, 92-93, 
97, 00 
81, 89-90, 94-
96, 03-04 
France 72, 75-76, 
94, 97 
74, 77, 81, 90 82-84,  
97-98, 00-
01 
86-87, 03-04 77-78,  
81-84, 00 
73, 75-76, 86-
87, 90, 93-96, 
03-04 
Germany 75, 82-83, 
86, 93, 02, 
09-10 
73, 80-81, 90 81-82, 85, 
89, 97-98, 
00-01, 11 
79, 87, 93-95, 
03-04 
97, 00 72-80, 83-84, 
86-88, 93-96, 
03-04 
Greece 82, 90, 95-
96, 00-03 
86, 89, 92-94, 
98 
83-86, 00-
01 
82, 88, 90-91, 
95-96, 03-04, 
08 
72-95 03-04 
Ireland 75-76, 81, 
88-89,  
92-94,  
98-99, 10-
12 
74, 77-79,  
83-85, 90-91, 
07-09 
88-89, 93-
94, 99-00, 
10-12 
79-80, 82-83, 
86-87, 02-04, 
07-08 
73-77,  
81-82, 84, 99-
2000 
86, 90-91, 03-
04, 08 
Italy 73-74, 94, 
99, 09 
76, 81-85, 92 93-95, 00 83-84, 86-87, 
90-91, 96-97, 
03-04 
73-85,  
93-95, 00 
87, 96-97, 03-
04 
Netherlands 71-72,  
94-95, 10 
73-74, 78-80, 
90, 07 
81, 84-85, 
89, 97, 00 
77, 79, 87, 
95, 02-04 
97 74-78, 83, 86-
88, 93-95 
Portugal 73-75, 80, 
83, 88, 94-
95, 98, 10 
76-79, 81-82, 
85, 87, 90-91, 
08 
77-80, 83-
84 
81-82, 89-93, 
02-04 
76-89, 94  
Spain 84-86, 88, 
95, 99 
78-81, 83,  
87-88, 07-08 
82-84, 93-
94 
85-91, 02-03, 
08 
76-78,  
81-84, 93-94 
74, 79, 
89-91, 03-04 
Sweden 86-87, 93-
94 
85, 92-93 78, 82-84, 
93-94,  
98-02, 09 
79-80, 85,  
89-91, 96,  
03-04, 10-12 
78-79, 82-84, 
93-94, 01-02, 09 
76, 96-97, 03-
04, 10-12 
United 
Kingdom 
74-75, 88, 
02, 09-10 
73, 76-77,  
81-82, 90, 98 
83-84,  
86-87,  
93-94, 08-
10 
80-81, 88-89, 
91, 97-99, 05, 
07, 11-12 
73-77,  
83-84, 87, 93-
94, 08-10 
79-81, 88, 97-
99 
# Years 
with 
episodes 
96 92 95 124 124 122 
Average 
duration of 
episodes 
(years) 
1.55 1.80 1.98 1.85 3.26 2.22 
 
 
Source: Author’s computations. Notes: 1ME - Measure based on the changes in the real short term interest 
rate;  2ME - Measure based on changes in the real effective exchange rate; 3ME - Measure based on the 
changes in the nominal effective exchange rate. 
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4. Empirical assessment 
4.1. Data description 
The data consists on an annual frequency time series ranging from 1970 to 2012 for 
private consumption, GDP, general government final consumption, social transfers, taxes, 
cyclically adjusted primary balance, general government debt, revenue and expenditure, that 
was taken from the AMECO database.
11
 We used 11 countries that belong to the EMU,
12
 
namely Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain and also Denmark, Sweden and The United Kingdom, which are not in the 
EMU, but are geographically and politically linked to the remaining countries. This means 
that a maximum of 602 observations are available per variable, throughout the entire panel. 
Tables XI-XIII in the Appendix show the descriptive statistics and unit root tests for 
the series used in the estimations. 
The unit root tests in table XII in the Appendix show that most series are stationary. 
For those that are not, it makes sense to include all the series in levels, as we have already 
computed significant changes on the original series, to such a degree that what we have, are 
the logarithms of the real per capita values. Otherwise we would risk losing some of the 
intuition behind the variable relationship, thus making the model more difficult to interpret.
13
 
 
4.2. Modelling expansionary fiscal consolidations 
 The strategy for accessing the potential differences between fiscal expansions and 
fiscal contractions is based on Afonso (2006, 2010). It consists on estimating the variation of 
private consumption, using budgetary variables and dummies for assessing fiscal and 
monetary episodes. The core specification will be: 
 
 
1 0 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 3
2 1 4 2 1 4 2 1 4
( )
( ) (1 )
av av
it i it it it it it
m
it it it it it it it
m
it it it it it it it it
C c C Y Y Y Y
FCE FCE TF TF TAX TAX FC
FCE FCE TF TF TAX TAX FC
    
     
      
  
  
  
         
         
          
(2) 
 
                                                 
11
 For full description of the original series, see table X in the Appendix. 
12
 Originally we also had Luxembourg, which was dropped, due to the lack of information on monetary data. 
13
 Our argument follows the explanation presented in Afonso (2006, 2010). 
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where ( 1,..., )i i N indicates the different countries and ( 1,..., )t t T  stands for the period. We 
also used: C – private consumption; Y  – GDP; avY – panel’s GDP average;14 FCE  – general 
government final consumption expenditure; TF  – social transfers; TAX  – taxes. All variables 
displayed correspond to the natural logarithm of the real per capita values.
15
 
mFC is a dummy 
variable, which identifies a fiscal consolidation episode, according to the three different 
criteria mentioned in the previous section ( 1,2,3)m  . Therefore, when m
itFC  is equal to one, 
there is a fiscal consolidation in period t, for country i, according to the criterion m. ic is an 
autonomous term which captures each country’s individual characteristics, being the source of 
cross-country heterogeneity in a Fixed Effects model, which will be our estimation choice. 
The disturbances it  are assumed to be independent and identically distributed across 
countries with zero mean and constant variance. 
 
4.2.1. Core specification outputs 
According to Greene (2012), we use the Fixed Effects (FE) estimation whenever we 
want to analyse the impact of variables that change over time. This explores the relationship 
between predictor and dependent variables within a country. The FE model removes the effect 
of time-invariant characteristics from the predictor variables, so that we can assess the 
independent variables net effect. An important assumption of the model is that time invariant 
characteristics are country-specific, and should not be correlated with other individual 
features. In other words, each country has unique attributes that are not the result of random 
variation and do not vary across time. The source of country heterogeneity is provided by the 
intercept ic  in specification (1), with Fixed Effects allowing for correlation between the latter 
and the repressors.
16
 
We perform redundant FE likelihood ratio tests for all estimations, with the null 
hypothesis being that there is no unobserved heterogeneity and so the model can be estimated 
by pooled OLS. If we reject this hypothesis, then fixed effects is more adequate than pooled 
                                                 
14
 The original specification in Afonso (2006, 2010), used the OECD’s GDP, instead of the panel average. 
Nevertheless, since OECD only displays that series starting from 1995, we followed Afonso & Jalles (2011), and 
used the panel average GDP. 
15
 For instance, in order to obtain the variable Y , we make the following calculations: 
/
ln
GDP DEF
Y
N
 
  
 
, where GDP stands for the GDP at current prices, DEF and N correspond to the 
GDP deflator and total population, respectively. 
16
 In the FE estimation, the intercept also works as a substitute for non-specified variables, yielding consistent 
estimates in the presence of correlation between the latter and the repressors, which favours the usage of this 
model in comparison to pooled OLS. 
  
14 
 
OLS, since it allows for cross country heterogeneity by permitting each one to have its own 
intercept value ( ic ).
17
  
Table III presents the estimation results for specification (2), according to the different 
criteria for identifying fiscal consolidation episodes. Both consumption and income are 
statistically significant across the different specifications. The negative sign for consumption 
in t-1 ( ) has obviously to do with the fact that lagged consumption has been considered an 
independent variable, therefore increasing consumption in period t-1 reduces its difference 
between t and t-1. The short-run elasticity of private consumption to income is similar across 
specifications, ranging between 0.083 and 0.087. 
There is a positive statistically significant relationship between the first difference of 
general government final consumption expenditure ( tFCE ) and private consumption ( tC ), 
when a fiscal consolidation ( mFC 1 ) occurs, across all of the estimations based on (2), with 
coefficients between 0.193 and 0.237. Such a relationship is in line with the traditional 
Keynesian effects, indicating that consumers are not behaving in a Ricardian way, since they 
do not seem to anticipate the need for increased taxation in the future, to compensate for an 
increase in government spending today.  
The previous relationship does not hold in the absence of a fiscal consolidation 
episode. Moreover, there is some evidence of non-Keynesian effects in the absence of fiscal 
consolidations ( mFC 0 ), if we look at the final consumption expenditure ( t 1FCE ) and 
taxes ( t 1TAX ) in column 3, and across the three different estimations, respectively. The 
negative sign in the short-run elasticity of general government final consumption expenditure 
to private consumption suggests a Ricardian behaviour, in the absence of fiscal 
consolidations. Similar non-Keynesian reasoning prevails for the relationship between taxes 
and consumption, meaning that an increase in taxes today, leads to increased spending, as 
consumers anticipate that there is no need for increased taxation in the future.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 We report the redundant FE likelihood ratio for all estimations. In any case, the no cross-country heterogeneity 
assumption is always rejected, which means that the FE estimator is more adequate than pooled OLS.   
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Table III – Fixed Effects estimation results for specification (2) 
  1FC   
2
FC   
3
FC   

 
1tC    -0.090*** 
(-3.62) 
 -0.089*** 
(-3.61) 
 -0.076*** 
(-3.05) 
 
0
 
1tY   0.084*** 
(3.06) 
 0.083*** 
(3.06) 
 0.087*** 
(3.14) 
 
1
 
tY  0.809*** 
(11.41) 
 0.812*** 
(11.51) 
 0.835*** 
(12.24) 
 
0
 
1
av
tY   -0.026* 
(-1.80) 
 -0.025* 
(-1.74) 
 -0.033** 
(-2.19) 
 
1
 
av
tY   -0.169** 
(-2.38) 
 -0.165** 
(-2.31) 
 -0.187*** 
(-2.62) 
 
1
 
1tFCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
mFC  
0.005 
(0.20) 
 0.010 
(0.50) 
 -0.001 
(-0.06) 
 
3
 
tFCE
 
0.193* 
(1.85) 
 0.214** 
(2.05) 
 0.237** 
(2.09) 
 
1
 
1tTF   0.003 
(0.22) 
 0.002 
(0.18) 
 -0.003 
(-0,13) 
 
3
 
tTF  -0.005 
(-0.06) 
 0.016 
(0.18) 
 0,063 
(0,49) 
 
1
 
1tTAX   0.005 
(0.23) 
 0.001 
(0.07) 
 0,007 
(0,33) 
 
3
 
tTAX
 
0.044 
(0.72) 
 0.033 
(0.67) 
 0,027 
(0,45) 
 
2
 
1tFCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1 )mFC   
 
-0.013 
(-0.98) 
 -0.015 
(-1.16) 
 -0,027** 
(-2,10 
 
4
 
tFCE
 
0.048 
(0.79) 
 0.041 
(0.67) 
 0,007 
(0,12) 
 
2
 
1tTF   0.002 
(0.22) 
 0.002 
(0.30) 
 0,000 
(-0,07) 
 
4
 
tTF  0.031 
(0.97) 
 0.033 
(1.05) 
 0,033 
(1,07) 
 
2
 
1tTAX   0.024** 
(2.15) 
 0.025** 
(2.26) 
 0,029** 
(2,43) 
 
4
 
tTAX
 
0.033 
(1.43) 
 0.029 
(1.21) 
 0,033 
(1,44) 
 
 N   454  454  440  
 2R   0.73  0.732  0,742  
   t-stat. p-val. t-stat. p-val. t-stat. p-val. 
Redundant FE likelihood 
ratio  
3.09 0.00 3.04 0.00 3.04 0.00 
Null hypothesis       
3 4 0    -1.74 0.08 1.54 0.12 1.35 0.18 
1 2 0    -0.45 0.65 -0.20 0.84 0.09 0.93 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Used robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
denotes statistically significant at a 10, 5 and a 1 percent level, respectively. 1FC - Measure based on Giavazzi & 
Pagano (1996); 2FC - Measure based on Alesina & Ardagna (1998); 3FC - Measure based on Afonso (2006, 
2010). 
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However, the Wald coefficient statistical tests suggest that there is no significant 
difference between the presence or absence of fiscal consolidations in relation to the short-run 
effects of government final consumption expenditure and taxation on private consumption 
(the null hypothesis: 3 4 0   and 1 2 0    are not rejected on the third, and all 
specifications, respectively). 
Compared with the literature that used similar methodology, as a whole, our results 
differ from Afonso (2006, 2010) and Afonso & Jalles (2012), since we find no evidence of 
non-Keynesian effects with regards to general government final consumption expenditure or 
taxes in the presence of fiscal consolidations ( mFC 1 ). However, our findings are similar 
for periods of no fiscal consolidation ( mFC 0 ), as there is some evidence of non-Keynesian 
effects in this case, for the mentioned budgetary variables. 
 
4.2.2. Fiscal consolidations and monetary expansions. 
The following specification is one of the main contributions of this paper, adding each 
country’s monetary developments to specification (2). It will permit a breakdown of all the 
possible combinations between fiscal contractions and monetary expansions, thus allowing 
for the study of the possible differences between them: 
                                                                                                                                        
1 0 1 1 0 1 1
10 1 30 10 1 30 10 1 30 50
20 1 40 20 1 40 20 1 40 60
( )
(
av av
it i it it it it it
l m l
it it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it i
C c C Y Y Y Y
FCE FCE TF TF TAX TAX M FC MX
FCE FCE TF TF TAX TAX M
    
      
      
  
  
  
         
           
         
11 1 31 11 1 31 11 1 31 51
21 1 41 21 1 41 21 1 41 61
) (1 )
( ) (1 )
( ) (1 )(1 )
l m l
t it it
l m l
it it it it it it it it it
l m l
it it it it it it it it it it
FC MX
FCE FCE TF TF TAX TAX M FC MX
FCE FCE TF TF TAX TAX M FC MX
      
       
  
  
  
            
             
     (3)    
  
 In addition to the repressors previously explained, litMX denotes a monetary expansion in 
period t ( 1,..., )t T for country i ( 1,..., )i N , according to the criteria l ( 1,2,3)l  . lM
corresponds to the relevant indicator used to calculate the monetary episodes on (1). We have 
found some evidence of non-Keynesian effects during fiscal consolidations in 5 out of the 9 
possible estimations.
18
 Tables IV and V show some of the most relevant estimation results. 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Note that since we have three different criteria for fiscal and monetary developments, the assessment of their 
relationship within the current framework yields 9 possible estimation outputs. The other outputs are available in 
tables XIV-XVII in the Appendix. 
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Table IV – Fixed Effects estimation for specification (3): 1st output 
   ,1 3FC MX
 
 ,2 1FC MX
 
 ,3 1FC MX
 
 
  
1tC    -0.096*** 
(-3.80) 
 -0.097*** 
(-4.05) 
 -0.097*** 
(-4.10) 
 
0
 
1tY   0.093*** 
(3.25) 
 0.099*** 
(3.64) 
 0.102*** 
(3.82) 
 
1
 
tY  0.803*** 
(10.93) 
 0.799*** 
(11.14) 
 0.789*** 
(11.17) 
 
0
 
1
av
tY   -0.019 
(-1.22) 
 -0.029** 
(-2.06) 
 -0.0294** 
(-2.06) 
 
1  
av
tY  
 -0.181** 
(-2.53) 
 -0.155** 
(-2.22) 
 -0.145** 
(-2.08) 
 
10
 
1tFCE    
 
 
 
 
 
mFC  
lMX  
0.050 
(1.40) 
 0.200 
(1.33) 
 -0.840*** 
(-14.24) 
 
30
 
tFCE  -0.213*** 
(-3.58) 
 -0.369* 
(-1.72) 
 -0.039 
(-0.30) 
 
10
 
1tTF   0.010 
(0.69) 
 0.026 
(0.84) 
 1.293*** 
(21.38) 
 
30
 
tTF  -0.130* 
(-1.83) 
 0.034 
(0.12) 
 -11.42*** 
(-19.53) 
 
10
 
1tTAX   -0.051** 
(-2.06) 
 -0.206* 
(-1.71) 
 -0.552*** 
(-9.29) 
 
30
 
tTAX  -0.132*** 
(-3.07) 
 0.484*** 
(4.55) 
 2.694*** 
(17.32) 
 
50
 
l
tM  
 0.096** 
(2.08) 
 0.003 
(0.49) 
 -0.215*** 
(-20.12) 
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Table V – Fixed Effects estimation for specification (3): 1st output (cont.) 
   ,1 3FC MX   ,2 1FC MX   ,3 1FC MX   
20
 
1tFCE    
 
 
 
 
 
(1 )mFC   
lMX  
 
 
 
-0.005 
(-0.24) 
 -0.035** 
(-2.15) 
 -0.038** 
(-2.39) 
 
40
 
tFCE  0.270** 
(2.51) 
 0.010 
(0.09) 
 0.010 
(0.09) 
 
20
 
1tTF   0.014 
(1.21) 
 -0.018 
(-1.57) 
 -0.018 
(-1.52) 
 
40
 
tTF  -0.043 
(-0.91) 
 -0.028 
(-0.58) 
 -0.029 
(-0.59) 
 
20
 
1tTAX   -0.007 
(-0.47) 
 0.056*** 
(3.74) 
 0.055*** 
(3.67) 
 
40
 
t
TAX  -0.027 
(-0.52) 
 -0.002 
(-0.04) 
 -0.004 
(-0.08) 
 
60
 
l
tM  
 0.025 
(0.52) 
 -0.000 
(-0.55) 
 -0.001 
(-0.48) 
 
11
 
1tFCE    
 
 
 
 
mFC  
(1 )lMX   
 
0.011 
(0.42) 
 0.005 
(0.22) 
 0.002 
(0.07) 
 
31
 
tFCE  0.260** 
(2.36) 
 0.310*** 
(3.57) 
 0.405*** 
(5.13) 
 
11
 
1tTF   -0.007 
(-0.40) 
 0.003 
(0.35) 
 -0.005 
(-0.37) 
 
31
 
tTF  -0.093 
(-1.01) 
 -0.025 
(-0.31) 
 -0.063 
(-0.59) 
 
11
 
1tTAX   -0.006 
(-0.28) 
 0.002 
(0.09) 
 0.008 
(0.40) 
 
31
 
tTAX  0.120 
(1.58) 
 -0.017 
(-0.36) 
 -0.051 
(-0.85) 
 
51
 
l
tM  
 0.044 
(0.84) 
 0.001 
(1.31) 
 0.002 
(1.78) 
 
21
 
1tFCE   
(1 )mFC   
(1 )lMX   
-0.021 
(-1.42) 
 -0.015 
(-0.98) 
 -0.017 
(-1.17) 
 
41
 
tFCE  0.006 
(0.10) 
 0.038 
(0.55) 
 0.029 
(0.42) 
 
21
 
1tTF   0.003 
(0.45) 
 0.005 
(0.61) 
 0.005 
(0.70) 
 
41
 
tTF  0.040 
(1.09) 
 0.057 
(1.64) 
 0.054 
(1.60) 
 
21
 
1tTAX   0.017 
(1.36) 
 0.018* 
(1.74) 
 0.016 
(1.58) 
 
41
 
tTAX  0.029 
(1.19) 
 0.046* 
(1.83) 
 0.044* 
(1.82) 
 
61
 
l
tM  
 0.036 
(1.23) 
 -0.001 
(-0.93) 
 -0.000 
(-0.88) 
 
 N  454  454  454  
     0.759  0.755  0.763  
   t-stat. p-val. t-stat. p-val. t-stat. p-val. 
Redundant FE 
likelihood ratio 
 
3.53 0.00 3.85 0.00 4.08 0.00 
 
 
Notes: Used robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denotes statistically significant at a 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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 We can see that when fiscal consolidations are matched by monetary expansion, there 
is a negative and statistically significant short-term elasticity between the government final 
consumption expenditure and private consumption ( 30 0   in the first and second outputs 
and 10 0   in the third output). This doesn’t hold when fiscal consolidations that are not 
accompanied by a monetary easing as 31 is positive and statistically significant, and 11 is not 
statistically significant across the respective outputs. The second and third estimation results 
also show some evidence of non-Keynesian elasticity on taxes, when there are both fiscal 
contractions and monetary expansions ( 30 0  ). Just like in previous cases, such effects seem 
to disappear when fiscal consolidations take place, without the respective monetary easing, as
31 is not statistically significant. The same pattern emerges again for social transfers on the 
first and third outputs ( 30  is negative and statistically significant, but 31  is not statistically 
significant).   
 The Wald coefficient restriction tests, in table XVIII in the Appendix, show that the 
difference between these coefficients is statistically significant in all cases, except for social 
transfers in the first output ( 30 31 0   is not rejected at a 10% level in this case). 
 A possible explanation relates to liquidity restrictions, which may prevent a Ricardian 
behaviour, thus undermining the permanent income hypothesis. If households do have 
liquidity constrains, a fiscal consolidation could indeed signal a future tax decrease and a 
permanent income rise, which is perceived by households, but does not materialize in current 
private consumption increase, due to limitations in access to credit markets. Such is 
summarised by Alesina & Ardagna (1998) as “the size of the increase in private consumption 
[following government spending cuts] depends on the absence of liquidity-constrained 
consumers”.  
The IS-LM framework argument presented by Ardagna (2004) that the signs of the 
coefficients may be biased, in the sense that they capture the monetary stance, is unlikely, as 
we are controlling for these.  
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4.3. Measuring the success of fiscal consolidations 
 In this section we will investigate what the factors are that may contribute to the 
success of fiscal consolidations. We computed dummy variables for successful fiscal 
adjustments in two different ways based on the literature, in order to assess whether our 
findings are robust across different criteria. The first measure ( 1
tSU ), is based on Afonso & 
Jalles (2012), who define a fiscal consolidation as being successful, if the change in the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance ( tb ) for two consecutive years is greater than the 
standard deviation ( ) of the full panel sample: 
    
 
1
1
0
1,
0,
t i
it
if b
SU
otherwise



 
 



. (4) 
 
We have also included a measure computed by Alesina & Ardagna (2013) which is 
based on the level of debt as a percentage of GDP. A fiscal consolidation is successful if the 
debt-to-GDP ratio two years after the end of the fiscal adjustment ( 2tDebt  ) is lower than the 
debt-to-GDP ratio in the last year of the adjustment ( tDebt ): 
 
22
1,
0,
t t
t
if Debt Debt
SU
otherwise
 
 

 (5) 
 
The identification of the leading policy option for the fiscal consolidation – either 
expenditure or revenue based – is also assessed through dummy variables. Therefore, a fiscal 
consolidation on period t  is defined as being expenditure based ( tEXP ), if the change in the 
total expenditure of the general government as a percentage of GDP in that period ( texp ) 
accounts for a proportion greater than  of the change in the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance ( tb ): 
 
 
exp
1,
0,
t
tt
if
bEXP
otherwise



 


. (6) 
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Following Afonso & Jalles (2012) we computed the composition of the adjustment for three 
different thresholds, so that  assumes the values of 1/2, 2/3 and 3/4. A similar process was 
conducted for the revenue based consolidations.  Table VI shows the number of fiscal 
consolidation episodes and their respective success rate (successes / total events), based on the 
criteria defined in the earlier sections. The identification of the successful episodes follows 
specifications (4) and (5). Table XIX in the Appendix shows the successful fiscal episodes for 
each country according to the different criteria. 
 
Table VI – Fiscal consolidation events and success rates 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 If we look at the successful events based on the change in CAPB for two consecutive 
years, 1SU , it can be seen that the success rates range from 51% to 61%, according to 1FC  
and 3FC , respectively. Although 2FC registers the highest number of successful 
consolidations, the success rate is slightly lower than in 3FC (57% vs 61%), and is thus 
penalised by the higher number of consolidation events (56 vs 46). Nevertheless, success rates 
are similar to the ones found in Afonso & Jalles (2012).    
 In the case of 2SU , it can be seen that there are significant differences across the 
criteria used to identify fiscal consolidations, namely between 1FC  and the remainder. This is 
actually the only criterion that has a success rate which is similar to the one found in the 1SU  
case, whilst 2FC and 3FC are below their peers, by more than 20 percentage points.  
 On the one hand, the main explanation for the difference between the success rates 
within 2SU , has to do with the duration of the fiscal consolidations, coupled with its lower 
flexibility, vis-à-vis 1SU . As seen earlier in Table I, the fiscal consolidations based on 1FC  
have a much higher duration than those of either 2FC or 3FC . The only requirement for a 
fiscal consolidation to be successful according to 2SU , is that the level of debt-to-GDP in two 
years after the end of the adjustment has to be lower than the one in the last year of the 
adjustment. Therefore, longer periods of adjustment will necessarily result in more successful 
  
1
SU  
2
SU  
 
Total events Successes Success rate (%) Successes Success rate (%) 
1FC  49 25 51% 29 59% 
2FC  56 32 57% 19 34% 
3FC  46 28 61% 17 37% 
Source: Author’s computations. Notes: 1SU - Measure of success based on (4); 2SU - 
Measure of success based on (5). 
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years of fiscal consolidation. The same does not occur in 1SU , as this allows for successful 
and non-successful years within the same adjustment period.
19
  
 On the other hand, since the success rates based on 1SU are generally higher than 
those in 2SU , one can argue that, based on these results, countries have been more successful 
in improving their fiscal position rather than their levels of debt ratio. This points to the 
possibility that, although there are improvements in the CAPB during fiscal consolidation 
periods, this does not necessarily result in a fiscal surplus, at least during the two years 
following on from the end of the adjustment. This ultimately impacts on countries’ debt ratios 
during that period. 
 In Table VII we present some facts about the expenditure and revenue-based 
consolidations, which were computed for the three different criteria used to identify fiscal 
contractions. By disentangling these, we can assess the possible differences regarding the 
criteria used to define fiscal consolidations as being successful and also the possible 
implications for GDP growth. This table shows the results computed for a threshold of 
=2/3, while the results for the other thresholds can be consulted in tables XX and XXI in the 
Appendix.  
 
Table VII – Expenditure and revenue based consolidations:  =2/3 
 
Total 
Events 
Average Size 
of the 
Consolidation 



1
0
t i
i
b  
2t t
Debt Debt   
Expenditure 
Based 1 23 2.36 2.87 -2.50 
Expenditure 
Based 2 23 2.83 3.07 -0.74 
Expenditure 
Based 3 18 3.49 3.65 -0.34 
Revenue 
Based 1 13 0.84 1.91 -1.06 
Revenue 
Based 2 15 1.64 1.32 4.49 
Revenue 
Based 3 13 1.93 1.71 4.77 
 
 
 We can see that in our panel there are significantly more expenditure-based 
consolidation events, rather than revenue-based ones. The number of expenditure-based 
                                                 
19
 This is a consequence that derives from the fact that Alesina & Ardagna (2013)  treat multi-year periods as a 
single episode and define all those years as either being successful, or not altogether, which might have some 
implications on the results. Perotti (2012) provides a detailed description of this issue. 
Source: Author’s computations.  
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consolidations range between 18, in 3FC  and 23, both in criteria one and two.  The revenue-
based consolidations account for 13 and 15 events, based on both 1FC and 3FC , and 2FC
respectively. 
 The average size of the consolidations (based on the change in the CAPB) is also 
higher in the expenditure-based cases across all the different criteria, compared to revenue-
based ones. The minimum difference is 1.19 percentage points (pp.) in case 2, but it can get as 
high as 1.56 pp. in case 3. Overall, there are stronger adjustments for the expenditure-based 
consolidations. These findings differ from Afonso & Jalles (2012), who report no significant 
difference between the size of the consolidation whether it is made via the expenditure, or the 
revenue side of the budget. 
 The next column (
1
0
t i
i
b 

 ) reports the changes in the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance for two consecutive years, used in 1SU . The differences between expenditure and 
revenue based consolidations lie roughly between 0.96 and 1.94 p.p., in cases one and three, 
respectively.  
 We can also look at the difference between the debt-to-GDP ratio two years after the 
end of the adjustment, and in the last year of the adjustment, in the following column, which 
was used to compute 2SU . All of the criteria report that, on average, the expenditure-based 
consolidations led to a decrease in the debt-to-GDP ratio over that period. On the revenue-
based side, there are significant differences between 1FC and the remainder. Whilst in the 
case of the latter there was a decrease in the debt-to-GDP ratio, in 2FC and 3FC it actually 
increased more than 4 percentage points. Nevertheless, even in the first case, we can see that 
there was a more significant improvement in the debt-to-GDP ratio for the expenditure-based 
consolidation.
20
  
 Following the results in table VII, we estimated a probit model based on Afonso & 
Jalles (2012), in order to assess if the reported differences between the expenditure and 
revenue-based consolidations are statistically relevant and impact on the success of the fiscal 
adjustments: 
 
    Pr 1| [ 1| ]i i i iSU Z E SU Z Z     (7) 
                                                 
20
 This is the only reported finding that doesn’t hold across the 3 different thresholds, only being true for  =2/3 
and  =3/4. For  =1/2 there is no significant difference between the expenditure and revenue-based episodes 
in 
1FC on this matter:-  
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where [ 1| ]iE SU Z  is the conditional expectation of the success of fiscal consolidation, 
given that iZ and SU refer to the dummy variables defined in (4) and (5). iZ  is defined as 
follows: 
 
 1 2 3 4 5i i i i iZ D b EXP MX           (8) 
 
iD  is the duration of fiscal consolidation, ib refers to the change in the cyclically adjusted 
primary balance, which accounts for the size of the consolidation. iEXP   was defined in (6) as 
a dummy variable that accounts for expenditure-based consolidations, according to different 
thresholds, while the same was done on the revenue side.  
 We also included iMX , which refers to the dummy variable used to identify the 
monetary expansions computed earlier, according to (1). The motivation behind this addition 
has to do with an issue raised in the recent literature, which is whether there is a possible 
influence by monetary expansions in determining the success of fiscal consolidations.  
 For instance, Devries et al. (2011) suggest that expenditure-based consolidations were 
more successful because they were complemented by monetary expansions, in the form of 
strong currency devaluations. Alesina et al. (2012) mention the importance of accompanying 
monetary policy in determining the possible heterogeneous effects of expenditure-based and 
revenue-based consolidations. Alesina & Ardagna (2013) also argue for the possible role of 
monetary policy in differentiating the effects of expenditure versus revenue-based 
adjustments.
21
  
  Table VIII shows the results for the success measure constructed by Afonso & Jalles 
(2012), based on 2FC .
22
 The results for the other criteria used to compute fiscal 
consolidations can be consulted in tables XXII and XXIII in the Appendix. 
 We can see that according to the measure first computed by Afonso & Jalles (2012), 
the success of the fiscal consolidations seems to be enhanced if they are based on expenditure 
cuts. On the other hand, we find no statistically significant results for the revenue-based 
consolidations. Moreover, both the duration and size of the consolidations seem to play a 
                                                 
21
  However, in this case they found that monetary policy had no significant impact. 
22
 Some observations were excluded, due to the fact that they occur in the last years of the sample and therefore 
we cannot assess whether they were successful, according to either (4) or (5). 
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significant role: longer and stronger consolidations appear to contribute positively for the 
success of the fiscal consolidations. These results are consistent for all of the reported 
thresholds in 2FC and 3FC . In the 1FC case, we only find statistically significant results for 
the size of the consolidations.
23
 With regard to the role of monetary policy, we find no 
statistically significant results.
24
  
 
Table VIII – Success of fiscal consolidations for 1SU , based on 2FC  
  Expenditure Revenue 
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 
constant -4.930*** 
(-3.17) 
-3.842*** 
(-2.93) 
-3.851*** 
(-2.97) 
-3.171*** 
(-2.79) 
-2.962** 
(-2.48) 
-2.962** 
(-2.48) 
duration 1.177** 
(1.99) 
0.974* 
(1.93) 
0.975* 
(1.94) 
0.860* 
(1.87) 
0.828* 
(1.72) 
0.828* 
(1.72) 
Δcapb 1.178*** 
(3.34) 
1.006*** 
(3.23) 
1.009*** 
(3.29) 
0.873*** 
(3.01) 
0.870*** 
(2.89) 
0.870*** 
(2.89) 
exp12 1.443*** 
(3.14) 
     
exp23  0.783* 
(1.70) 
    
exp34   0.783* 
(1.70) 
   
rev12    0.059 
(0.12) 
  
rev23     -0.296 
(-0.62) 
 
rev34      -0.296 
(-0.62) 
mx2 0.031 
(0.06) 
0.055 
(0.11) 
0.059 
(0.11) 
0.343 
(0.57) 
0.243 
(0.46) 
0.243 
(0.46) 
2R  0.487 0.414 0.414 0.381 0.386 0.386 
N 50 50 50 50 50 50 
  
 
 
 
Table IX shows the results for the success criterion 2SU , based on 1FC . The results for 
2FC and 3FC can be consulted in tables XXIV and XXV in the Appendix. The results are 
similar to the ones found in the 1SU case and are related to the role of duration and 
expenditure-based adjustments in the success of fiscal consolidations. Moreover, we have 
found some evidence that the revenue-based consolidations have a negative impact on the 
                                                 
23
 See tables XXII and XXIII in the Appendix for 1FC and 3FC . 
24
 Results for 3MX are available on request and do not alter the overall findings. We could not compute the 
estimations for 1MX , as it predicts perfectly the success of the fiscal consolidations. 
Notes: Used robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denotes statistically significant at a 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 12, 23 and 34 next to exp and 
rev refer to the relevant value for , according to (6).  
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success of the adjustment. On the other hand, contrary to the findings for 1SU , it seems that 
the size of the consolidation has a negative impact on the success of the consolidation and is 
not robust across the different criteria.  
 
Table IX - Success of fiscal consolidations for 2SU , based on 1FC  
 Expenditure Revenue 
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 
constant -1.672 
(-1.41) 
-1.690 
(-1.42) 
-1.884 
(-1.41) 
-0.850 
(-0.90) 
-0.519 
(-0.52) 
-0.519 
(-0.52) 
duration 0.821** 
(2.56) 
0.832*** 
(2.61) 
0.860** 
(2.42) 
0.720*** 
(3.06) 
0.923*** 
(3.41) 
0.923*** 
(3.41) 
Δcapb -0.262** 
(-2.03) 
-0.263** 
(-2.04) 
-0.221* 
(-1.87) 
-0.233* 
(-1.70) 
-0.404*** 
(-2.65) 
-0.404*** 
(-2.65) 
exp12 1.600** 
(2.48) 
     
exp23  1.601** 
(2.46) 
    
exp34   1.938** 
(2.49) 
   
rev12    -0.317 
(-0.55) 
  
rev23     -1.571** 
(-1.99) 
 
rev34      -1.571** 
(-1.99) 
mx2 -0.382 
(-0.69) 
-0.389 
(-0.70) 
-0.238 
(-0.40) 
-0.175 
(-0.33) 
-0.410 
(-1.67) 
-0.410 
(-1.67) 
   0.478 0.477 0.511 0.352 0.440 0.440 
N 39 39 39 39 39 39 
 
 
 
 
Regarding the role of monetary policy, if we look at the 2FC  case in table XXIV in 
the Appendix, there seems to be some evidence that real currency devaluations ( 2MX ) 
contribute negatively to the success of the adjustments. However, since we cannot check the 
robustness of these results with monetary expansion based on real short term interest rate (
1MX ), on account of the same problem that was reported earlier for
1SU , we were unable to 
extract a clear conclusion here. Furthermore, the fact that 1MX  predicts perfectly the success 
of the fiscal consolidations, could actually lead to conclusions opposed to the ones found for 
either 2MX , or 3MX . So we would rather say that the impact of monetary easing on the 
success of the fiscal consolidations is not clear.  
Notes: Used robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denotes statistically significant at a 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 12, 23 and 34 next to exp and 
rev refer to the relevant value for , according to (6). 
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To sum up, the most robust findings for the success of fiscal consolidation were 
obtained for the impact of duration and expenditure-based consolidations. Both contribute 
positively to the success of fiscal adjustments across the different criteria. In addition, there is 
some evidence that fiscal consolidations based on tax raises have a negative impact on the 
success of fiscal consolidations. 
The size of the consolidation gives us mixed evidence: it seems to contribute 
positively to the success of fiscal consolidations based on 1SU , which is consistent with 
Afonso & Jalles (2012), but the opposite is verified for 2SU . The role of monetary policy is 
also unclear. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper aims to provide new insights about expansionary fiscal consolidations in 
the EMU, by incorporating monetary developments on specifications previously used in 
empirical research. The Fixed Effects panel estimations conducted for 14 European Union 
countries show no evidence of non-Keynesian effects during fiscal consolidations, when 
monetary policy developments are not considered. Nevertheless, there is some evidence of 
non-Keynesian effects in the absence of fiscal consolidations.  
On the other hand, when the baseline specification is extended to take into account 
monetary developments, there is some evidence of non-Keynesian effects during fiscal 
consolidations. When fiscal consolidation episodes are matched by a monetary expansion, 
there is a shift in the standard Keynesian impact of government final-consumption 
expenditure and taxation on private consumption.  
Overall, when fiscal consolidations are not matched by a monetary expansion, the non-
Keynesian effects evidenced earlier, disappear. The size of the increase in private 
consumption due to fiscal consolidation depends on the absence of liquidity-constrained 
households, which may prevent Ricardian behaviour, thus undermining the permanent income 
hypothesis of consumption smoothing. Monetary expansion provides the necessary liquidity 
increase during fiscal consolidations to allow individuals to smooth their consumption. 
 As a result of the success of fiscal consolidations, countries have been more effective 
in improving their fiscal position, rather than their levels of debt ratio. Improvements in the 
CAPB during the fiscal consolidation periods do not necessarily result in a fiscal surplus, at 
least during the two years following the end of an adjustment, which ultimately impacts on 
countries’ debt ratios. 
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 Generally, we found stronger adjustments for expenditure-based consolidations, as 
their size is significantly higher, vis à vis revenue-based ones. 
The probit estimations show evidence that suggests that longer-lasting adjustment 
periods seem to contribute positively to their success. Even so, the role of the size of 
consolidations in this scenario is unclear. 
Additionally, expenditure-based consolidations are more likely to be successful than 
ones based on tax rises. These findings are more robust for expenditure-based consolidations.  
The overall role of monetary policy in the success of fiscal consolidations is unclear. 
On one hand, we have some (albeit scarce) evidence that monetary expansions based on real 
currency devaluations, contribute negatively to the success of fiscal consolidations. On the 
other hand, we cannot perform probit estimations for monetary expansions based on real 
interest rates, as these predict nearly perfectly the success of fiscal consolidations, which 
means that in almost every case, a monetary expansion based on the real interest rate is 
associated with a successful fiscal adjustment. 
Future research may include the assessment of factors that could influence the 
occurrence of expansionary episodes, through a binary choice model and also the use of the 
so-called policy action-based approach for identifying fiscal episodes. 
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Appendix 
 
Table X – Data sources 
Original Series AMECO 
Code 
Total population, thousands. NPTN 
Gross domestic product, millions, national currency, current market prices. UVGD 
Price deflator of gross domestic product, national currency, 2005=100. PVGD 
Private final consumption expenditure at 2005 constant prices, millions, national currency. OCPH 
Final consumption expenditure of general government at 2005 constant prices, millions, national 
currency. 
OCTG 
Social benefits other than social transfers in kind, general government, millions, national 
currency, current prices. 
UYTGH 
Current taxes on income and wealth (direct taxes), general government, millions, national 
currency, current prices. 
UTYG 
Total expenditure: general government: ESA 1995 (including one-off proceeds - treated as 
negative expenditure) relative to the allocation of mobile phone licences (UMTS)).   
UUTG 
Total revenue: general government: ESA 1995. URTG 
General government consolidated gross debt: Excessive deficit procedure (based on ESA 1995) 
and former definition (linked series); % GDP   
UDGGL 
Taxes linked to imports and production (indirect taxes), general government, millions, national 
currency, current prices. 
UTVG 
Net borrowing (+), or net lending (-), excluding interest, of general government adjusted for the 
cyclical component. Adjustment based on potential GDP excessive deficit procedure (% of GDP 
at market prices). 
UBLGBP 
Real short-term interest rates, deflator private consumption. ISRC 
Nominal Effective exchange rate 2005=100: Performance relative to the rest of 24 industrial 
countries: double export weights: EU-15, TR CH NR US CA JP AU MX and NZ. 
XUNNQ 
Real effective exchange rate, consumer price index deflated; 2005=100; IMF Statistics Database  
      
 
Table XI – Descriptive statistics of the variables used to identify the fiscal and monetary 
episodes 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. N 
bt  -0.01 16.41 -15.62 2.01 454 
1M  -0.03 10.61 -15.66 2.43 558 
2M  0.18 26.62 -17.92 4.42 501 
3M  -0.52 16.73 -21.40 4.88 588 
Source: Author’s computations. Notes: bt  – Change in cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance; 1M  – Absolute change of the  real short term interest rate; 
2M   – Percent change of the real effective exchange rate; 3M  – Percent 
change of the nominal effective exchange rate; All indicators were computed 
based on annual data. 
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Table XII – Unit root tests for the series used in the fixed effects estimations 
  Common Unit Root (LLC) Individual Unit Root (IPS) 
  t-stat. p-value N t-stat. p-value N 
C  -7.14 0.00 574 -2.02 0.02 574 
C  -3.31 0.00 560 -6.70 0.00 560 
Y  -6.01 0.00 574 -1.11 0.13 574 
Y  -9.83 0.00 560 -9.74 0.00 560 
avY  -6.74 0.00 574 -1.20 0.12 574 
avY  -12.41 0.00 560 -9.01 0.00 560 
FCE  -9.43 0.00 574 -4.86 0.00 574 
FCE  -4.28 0.00 560 -5.01 0.00 560 
TF  -7.42 0.00 456 -2.32 0.01 456 
TF  -7.89 0.00 442 -7.72 0.00 442 
TAX -5.02 0.00 456 -0.95 0.17 456 
TAX  -8.83 0.00 442 -8.37 0.00 442 
1M  -12.47 0.00 530 -15.70 0.00 530 
2M  -9.24 0.00 473 -9.29 0.00 473 
3M  -9.66 0.00 560 -10.73 0.00 560 
                  
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table XIII - Descriptive statistics for the series used in probit estimations 
 
Series Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Observations 
 tb  -0.01 -0.04 16.41 -15.62 2.00 456 
 
      
Exp  0.22 0.07 17.35 -18.41 2.25 470 
 
      
Rev  0.17 0.24 4.44 -4.24 1.21 470 
 
      
Debt  57.45 55.02 170.31 6.15 29.15 586 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s computations. Notes: LLC – Levin, Lin and Choo test; 
IPS – Im, Pesaran and Chin test. 
Source: Author’s computations. Notes:  tb – Change in the cyclically adjusted 
primary balance; Exp  – Change in the general government expenditure; Rev  
– Change in general government revenue; Debt  – General government gross 
debt; All variables are expressed as GDP ratios. 
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Table XIV – Fixed Effects estimation for specification (3): 2nd output  
   ,1 1FC MX   ,1 2FC MX
 
 ,2 2FC MX
 
 
  
1tC    -0.097*** 
(-4.05) 
 -0.091*** 
(-3.76) 
 -0.090*** 
(-3.74) 
 
0
 
1tY   0.103*** 
(3.77) 
 0.079*** 
(3.00) 
 0.077*** 
(2.95) 
 
1
 
tY  0.795*** 
(11.01) 
 0.740*** 
(10.89) 
 0.745*** 
(10.83) 
 
0
 
1
av
tY   -0.030** 
(-2.13) 
 -0.024 
(-1.61) 
 -0.024 
(-1.60) 
 
1  
av
tY  
 -0.148** 
(-2.14) 
 -0.136** 
(-1.97) 
 -0.133* 
(-1.92) 
 
10
 
1tFCE    
 
 
 
 
 
mFC  
lMX  
0.984*** 
(6.73) 
 0.069* 
(1.69) 
 0.107  
(1.91) 
 
30
 
tFCE  -2.288*** 
(-6.53) 
 -0.161 
(-0.89) 
 -0.124 
(-0.70) 
 
10
 
1tTF   -0.275*** 
(-5.74) 
 0.007 
(0.50) 
 0.012 
(0.822) 
 
30
 
tTF  -3.041*** 
(-6.35) 
 0.089 
(0.44) 
 -0.022 
(-0.09) 
 
10
 
1tTAX   -0.621*** 
(-6.50) 
 -0.056 
(-1.46) 
 -0.091* 
(-1.68) 
 
30
 
tTAX  -1.98*** 
(-5.94) 
 0.057 
(0.41) 
 0.049 
(0.33) 
 
50
 
l
tM  
 0.024*** 
(5.59) 
 0.098 
(0.83) 
 0.076 
(0.57) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Used robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denotes statistically significant at a 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table XV – Fixed Effects estimation for specification (3): 2nd output (cont.) 
   ,1 1FC MX   ,FC MX1 2   ,2 2FC MX   
20
 
1tFCE    
 
 
 
 
 
(1 )mFC   
lMX  
 
 
 
-0.036** 
(-2.19) 
 -0.007 
(-0.34) 
 -0.003 
(-0.13) 
 
40
 
tFCE  0.023 
(0.20) 
 -0.062 
(-1.02) 
 -0.060 
(-1.03) 
 
20
 
1tTF   -0.019 
(-1.62) 
 -0.022** 
(-2.24) 
 -0.022** 
(-2.36) 
 
40
 
tTF  -0.041 
(-0.85) 
 -0.083* 
(-1.73) 
 -0.073 
(-1.58) 
 
20
 
1tTAX   0.055*** 
(3.64) 
 0.041*** 
(2.93) 
 0.039*** 
(2.87) 
 
40
 
t
TAX  0.013 
(0.28) 
 0.013 
(0.33) 
 0.015 
(0.41) 
 
60
 
l
tM  
 -0.001 
(-0.92) 
 0.098 
(2.41) 
 0.107*** 
(2.64) 
 
11
 
1tFCE    
 
 
 
 
mFC  
(1 )lMX   
 
-0.006 
(-0.23) 
 -0.021 
(-0.72) 
 -0.006 
(-0.29) 
 
31
 
tFCE  0.321*** 
(3.54) 
 0.363*** 
(4.16) 
 0.375*** 
(4.80) 
 
11
 
1tTF   0.007 
(0.50) 
 0.011 
(0.71) 
 0.005 
(0.32) 
 
31
 
tTF  -0.076 
(-0.97) 
 -0.110 
(-1.24) 
 -0.100 
(-0.99) 
 
11
 
1tTAX   0.006 
(0.26) 
 0.025 
(1.11) 
 0.019 
(0.98) 
 
31
 
tTAX  0.027 
(0.48) 
 0.140** 
(2.47) 
 0.067 
(1.60) 
 
51
 
l
tM  
 0.002 
(1.32) 
 0.028 
(0.49) 
 0.032 
(0.55) 
 
21
 
1tFCE   
(1 )mFC   
(1 )lMX   
-0.014 
(-0.94) 
 -0.015 
(-1.03) 
 -0.016 
(-1.14) 
 
41
 
tFCE  0.039 
(0.58) 
 0.091 
(1.29) 
 0.083 
(1.14) 
 
21
 
1tTF   0.005 
(0.74) 
 0.008 
(1.15) 
 0.008 
(1.24) 
 
41
 
tTF  0.060* 
(1.69) 
 0.046 
(1.33) 
 0.050 
(1.49) 
 
21
 
1tTAX   0.015 
(1.44) 
 0.024** 
(2.20) 
 0.026** 
(2.36) 
 
41
 
tTAX  0.043* 
(1.78) 
 0.056** 
(2.46) 
 0.054** 
(2.28) 
 
61
 
l
tM  
 -0.001 
(-1.01) 
 0.037 
(1.39) 
 0.040 
(1.49) 
 
 N  454  454  454  
     0.758  0.755  0.779  
   t-stat. p-val. t-stat. p-val. t-stat. p-val. 
Redundant FE 
likelihood ratio 
 
4.03 0.00 3.62 0.00 3.46 0.00 
 
 
Notes: Used robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denotes statistically significant at a 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table XVI – Fixed Effects estimation for specification (3): 3rd output 
   ,2 3FC MX
 
 ,3 2FC MX
 
 ,3 3FC MX
 
 
  
1tC    -0.093*** 
(-4.05) 
 -0.084*** 
(-3.51) 
 -0.092*** 
(-3.63) 
 
0
 
1tY   0.091*** 
(3.15) 
 0.075*** 
(2.84) 
 0.093*** 
(3.26) 
 
1
 
tY  0.810*** 
(11.05) 
 0.766*** 
(11.30) 
 0.804*** 
(10.87) 
 
0
 
1
av
tY   -0.016 
(-0.96) 
 -0.026* 
(-1.72) 
 -0.017 
(-1.06) 
 
1  
av
tY  
 -0.166** 
(-2.29) 
 -0.151** 
(-2.17) 
 -0.167** 
(-2.30) 
 
10
 
1tFCE    
 
 
 
 
 
mFC  
lMX  
0.031 
(0.83) 
 0.278** 
(2.04) 
 0.052  
(1.35) 
 
30
 
tFCE  0.000 
(0.00) 
 -0.576 
(-1.27) 
 0.084 
(0.59) 
 
10
 
1tTF   -0.020 
 (-1.16) 
 -0.008 
(-0.31) 
 -0.033 
(-1.57) 
 
30
 
tTF  0.038 
(0.45) 
 -0.873 
(-0.98) 
 -0.079 
(-0.51) 
 
10
 
1tTAX   -0.015 
(-0.56) 
 -0.229* 
(-1.79) 
 -0.019 
(-0.62) 
 
30
 
tTAX  -0.010 
(-0.11) 
 -0.338 
(-1.11) 
 -0.103 
(-0.84) 
 
50
 
l
tM  
 0.172 
(2.47) 
 -0.095 
(-0.39) 
 0.220*** 
(2.79) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Used robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denotes statistically significant at a 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table XVII – Fixed Effects estimation for specification (3): 3rd output (cont.) 
   ,2 3FC MX   ,3 2FC MX   ,3 3FC MX   
20
 
1tFCE    
 
 
 
 
 
(1 )mFC   
lMX  
 
 
 
-0.008 
(-0.37) 
 -0.003 
(-0.16) 
 -0.006 
(-0.28) 
 
40
 
tFCE  0.193* 
(1.83) 
 -0.062 
(-1.03) 
 0.167* 
(1.68) 
 
20
 
1tTF   0.011 
(1.05) 
 -0.018* 
(-1.89) 
 0.008 
(0.82) 
 
40
 
tTF  -0.034 
(-0.80) 
 -0.046 
(-0.93) 
 -0.029 
(-0.82) 
 
20
 
1tTAX   -0.007 
(-0.41) 
 0.035** 
(2.54) 
 -0.007 
(-0.44) 
 
40
 
t
TAX  -0.038 
(-0.67) 
 0.030 
(0.75) 
 -0.048 
(-0.85) 
 
60
 
l
tM  
 0.035 
(0.83) 
 0.090** 
(2.26) 
 0.048 
(1.18) 
 
11
 
1tFCE    
 
 
 
 
mFC  
(1 )lMX   
 
0.001 
(0.04) 
 -0.001 
(-0.03) 
 0.000 
(0.02) 
 
31
 
tFCE  0.254** 
(2.14) 
 0.375*** 
(5.07) 
 0.318** 
(2.58) 
 
11
 
1tTF   0.004 
(0.22) 
 -0.008 
(-0.51) 
 -0.003 
(-0.14) 
 
31
 
tTF  -0.041 
(-0.41) 
 -0.106 
(-1.01) 
 -0.051 
(-0.48) 
 
11
 
1tTAX   -0.009 
(-0.41) 
 0.024 
(1.16) 
 -0.004 
(-0.20) 
 
31
 
tTAX  0.066 
(1.16) 
 0.053 
(1.16) 
 0.090 
(1.40) 
 
51
 
l
tM  
 0.065 
(1.08) 
 -0.010 
(-0.12) 
 0.022 
(0.21) 
 
21
 
1tFCE   
(1 )mFC   
(1 )lMX   
-0.024* 
(-1.67) 
 -0.016 
(-1.12) 
 -0.024* 
(-1.72) 
 
41
 
tFCE  0.003 
(0.05) 
 0.079 
(1.10) 
 0.003 
(0.05) 
 
21
 
1tTF   0.002 
(0.26) 
 0.008 
(1.14) 
 0.002 
(0.31) 
 
41
 
tTF  0.042 
(1.14) 
 0.049 
(1.50) 
 0.039 
(1.06) 
 
21
 
1tTAX   0.017 
(1.29) 
 0.026** 
(2.31) 
 0.016 
(1.23) 
 
41
 
tTAX  0.024 
(0.94) 
 0.054** 
(2.28) 
 0.024 
(0.97) 
 
61
 
l
tM  
 0.035 
(1.21) 
 0.043 
(1.78) 
 0.038 
(1.47) 
 
 N  454  454  454  
     0.752  0.780  0.756  
   t-stat. p-val. t-stat. p-val. t-stat. p-val. 
Redundant FE 
likelihood ratio 
 
3.26 0.00 3.33 0.00 3.29 0.00 
 
 
Notes: Used robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denotes statistically significant at a 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table XVIII – Wald coefficient diagnostics for estimations based on specification (3) 
   ,1 3FC MX   ,2 1FC MX   ,3 1FC MX   
 Null Hypothesis  t-stat. p-val. t-stat. p-val. t-stat. p-val. 
 
10 11 0     1.03 0.30 1.28 0.20 -14.01 0.00 
 
30 31 0     -3.93 0.00 -2.97 0.00 -3.02 0.00 
 
10 11 0     0.86 0.39 0.69 0.49 21.64 0.00 
 
30 31 0     -0.32 0.75 0.20 0.84 -19.08 0.00 
 
10 11 0     -1.53 0.13 -1.73 0.08 -9.75 0.00 
 
30 31 0     -2.95 0.00 4.38 0.00 16.32 0.00 
   ,1 1FC MX   ,1 2FC MX   ,2 2FC MX   
 Null Hypothesis  t-stat. p-val. t-stat. p-val. t-stat. p-val. 
 
10 11 0     6.43 0.00 1.98 0.05 1.96 0.05 
 
30 31 0     -7.14 0.00 -2.60 0.01 -2.58 0.01 
 
10 11 0     -5.49 0.00 -0.21 0.83 0.36 0.72 
 
30 31 0     -6.05 0.00 0.91 0.36 0.30 0.76 
 
10 11 0     -6.67 0.00 -1.94 0.05 -2.00 0.05 
 
30 31 0     -5.93 0.00 -0.55 0.58 -0.12 0.91 
   ,2 3FC MX   ,3 2FC MX   ,3 3FC MX   
 Null Hypothesis  t-stat. p-val. t-stat. p-val. t-stat. p-val. 
 10 11 0     0.81 0.42 2.02 0.04 1.30 0.19 
 30 31 0     -1.45 0.15 -2.06 0.04 -1.31 0.19 
 10 11 0     -1.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 -1.15 0.25 
 30 31 0     0.60 0.55 -0.85 0.39 -0.15 0.88 
 10 11 0     -0.21 0.83 -1.99 0.05 -0.40 0.69 
 30 31 0     -0.74 0.46 -1.27 0.20 -1.40 0.16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Wald coefficient diagnostics for the estimations on tables IV-V, XIV-XV and XVI-XVII respectively. 
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Table XIX – Successful fiscal consolidations according to the different criteria  
(1970-2012) 
 SU
1
 SU
2
 
Country FC
1
 FC
2
 FC
3
 FC
1
 FC
2
 FC
3
 
Austria   84, 05 84, 05  01, 05 01, 05 
Belgium  82-84 82-84 82, 84 82-87   
Denmark 83-86 83-86 83-86 83-87 83-86 83-86 
Finland  97, 00 88, 96-97, 
00  
88, 96, 00 97-98 88, 96-97 88, 96, 00 
France         
Germany  96, 99 96, 11 96, 11 96-99   
Greece  93-94,  
10-11 
91, 94, 10-
11 
91, 94, 
 10-11 
96   
Ireland  11 88, 11 88, 11  88 88 
Italy  92  82, 92 82, 92 92-94   
Netherlands  91 91 91 93 93, 96 93, 96 
Portugal  83, 11 83, 88, 11 83, 88, 11  86, 88 86, 88 
Spain        
Sweden 97 96-97 96-97 97-99 96-97 96-97 
United 
Kingdom 
97-99, 11 97-98, 11 11 97-00 97-98, 00 00 
# 
Successful 
years 
25 32 28 29 19 17 
 
 
 
 
 
Table XX – Expenditure and revenue based consolidations:  =1/2 
 
Total 
Events 
Average Size 
of the 
Consolidation 
1
0
t i
i
b 

  
2t tDebt Debt   
Expenditure 
Based 1 24 2.34 2.94 -2.50 
Expenditure 
Based 2 27 2.75 3.07 -0.85 
Expenditure 
Based 3 22 3.25 3.53 -1.08 
Revenue 
Based 1 19 1.28 2.24 -2.62 
Revenue 
Based 2 22 1.94 2.13 2.07 
Revenue 
Based 3 19 2.17 2.39 2.61 
 
 
Source: Author’s computations.  
Source: Author’s computations. Notes: 1SU - Success measure based on Afonso & Jalles (2012); 2SU - 
Success measure based on Alesina & Ardagna (2013); 
1FC - Measure based on Giavazzi & Pagano 
(1996); 
2FC - Measure based on Alesina & Ardagna (1998); 3FC - Measure based on Afonso (2006, 
2010). 
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Table XXI – Expenditure and revenue based consolidations:  =3/4 
 
Total 
Events 
Average Size 
of the 
Consolidation 
1
0
t i
i
b 

  
2t tDebt Debt   
Expenditure 
Based 1 21 2.34 2.86 -2.52 
Expenditure 
Based 2 22 2.75 3.07 -0.64 
Expenditure 
Based 3 17 3.42 3.68 -0.16 
Revenue 
Based 1 12 0.71 1.91 -1.06 
Revenue 
Based 2 14 1.58 1.32 4.49 
Revenue 
Based 3 12 1.89 1.71 4.77 
 
 
 
Table XXII – Success of fiscal consolidations for
1
SU  based on 
1
FC  
 Expenditure Revenue 
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 
constant -1.229* 
(-1.79) 
-1.182* 
(-1.73) 
-1.091 
(-1.61) 
-1.601** 
(-2.14) 
-1.660** 
(-2.16) 
-1.660** 
(-2.16) 
duration 0.184 
(1.12) 
0.186 
(1.14) 
0.197 
(1.18) 
0.208 
(1.31) 
0.218 
(1.34) 
0.218 
(1.34) 
Δcapb 0.516*** 
(3.85) 
0.511*** 
(3.87) 
0.500*** 
(3.83) 
0.548*** 
(3.85) 
0.579*** 
(3.58) 
0.579*** 
(3.58) 
exp12 -0.080 
(-0.18) 
     
exp23  -0.179 
(-0.40) 
    
exp34   -0.433 
(-0.95) 
   
rev12    0.416 
(0.91) 
  
rev23     0.544 
(1.00) 
 
rev34      0.544 
(1.00) 
mx2 -0.188 
(-0.38) 
-0.175 
(-0.35) 
-0.150 
(-0.30) 
-0.111 
(-0.22) 
-0.111 
(-0.21) 
-0.111 
(-0.21) 
   0.303 0.305 0.317 0.315 0.320 0.320 
N 43 43 43 43 43 43 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s computations.  
Notes: Used robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denotes statistically significant at a 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 12, 23 and 34 next to exp and 
rev refer to the relevant value for , according to (6). 
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Table XXIII – Success of fiscal consolidations for 1SU  based on 3FC  
 Expenditure Revenue 
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 
constant -5.197*** 
(-2.74) 
-14.678*** 
(-2.61) 
-14.678*** 
(-2.61) 
-10.752*** 
(-2.84) 
-10.622*** 
(-3.11) 
-10.622*** 
(-3.11) 
duration  3.375** 
(2.02) 
3.375** 
(2.02) 
2.447** 
(2.19) 
2.481** 
(2.35) 
2.481** 
(2.35) 
Δcapb 2.052*** 
(2.73) 
4.596*** 
(2.73) 
4.596*** 
(2.73) 
3.688*** 
(2.89) 
3.586*** 
(3.21) 
3.586*** 
(3.21) 
exp12 1.362*** 
(2.70) 
     
exp23  1.375* 
(1.74) 
    
exp34   1.375* 
(1.74) 
   
rev12    -0.704 
(-1.19) 
  
rev23     -0.852 
(-1.23) 
 
rev34      -0.852 
(-1.23) 
mx2 -0.180 
(-0.28) 
-0.373 
(-0.49) 
-0.373 
(-0.49) 
-0.024 
(-0.03) 
0.060 
(0.09) 
0.060 
(0.09) 
   0.522 0.603 0.603 0.566 0.577 0.577 
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Used robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denotes statistically significant at a 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 12, 23 and 34 next to exp and 
rev refer to the relevant value for , according to (6). 
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Table XXIV – Success of fiscal consolidations for 2SU  based on 2FC  
 Expenditure Revenue 
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 
constant -0.293 
(-0.51) 
0.019 
(0.04) 
-0.011 
(-0.02) 
0.249 
(0.42) 
0.931 
(1.41) 
0.931 
(1.41) 
duration 0.011 
(0.06) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
-0.008 
(-0.04) 
-0.124 
(-0.64) 
-0.124 
(-0.64) 
Δcapb -0.040 
(-0.33) 
-0.054 
(-0.46) 
-0.048 
(-0.40) 
-0.067 
(-0.55) 
-0.130 
(-1.03) 
-0.130 
(-1.03) 
exp12 0.860** 
(2.12) 
     
exp23  0.356 
(0.88) 
    
exp34   0.397 
(1.64) 
   
rev12    -0.115 
(-0.271) 
  
rev23     -1.121** 
(-2.15) 
 
rev34      -1.121** 
(-2.15) 
mx2 -1.215** 
(-2.40) 
-1.093** 
(-2.20) 
-1.078** 
(-2.22) 
-1.011* 
(-1.89) 
-1.308** 
(-2.44) 
-1.308** 
(-2.44) 
   0.136 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.146 0.146 
N 45 45 45 45 45 45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Used robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denotes statistically significant at a 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 12, 23 and 34 next to exp and 
rev refer to the relevant value for , according to (6). 
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Table XXV – Success of fiscal consolidations for 2SU  based on 3FC  
 Expenditure Revenue 
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 
constant -0.477 
(-0.71) 
-0.076 
(-0.12) 
-0.004 
(-0.01) 
0.263 
(0.38) 
0.815 
(1.18) 
0.815 
(1.18) 
duration 0.176 
(0.78) 
0.147 
(0.70) 
0.137 
(0.66) 
0.149 
(0.71) 
0.050 
(0.24) 
0.050 
(0.24) 
Δcapb -0.097 
(-0.62) 
-0.116 
(-0.78) 
-0.104 
(-0.69) 
-0.140 
(-0.87) 
-0.202 
(-1.29) 
-0.202 
(-1.29) 
exp12 1.036** 
(2.37) 
     
exp23  0.482 
(1.10) 
    
exp34   0.187 
(0.42) 
   
rev12    -0.246 
(-0.53) 
  
rev23     -0.993* 
(-1.94) 
 
rev34      -0.993* 
(-1.94) 
mx2 -0.765 
(-1.30) 
-0.679 
(-1.19) 
-0.534 
(-0.90) 
-0.602 
(-0.98) 
-0.786 
(-1.28) 
-0.786 
(-1.28) 
   0.142 0.057 0.039 0.041 0.109 0.109 
N 37 37 37 37 37 37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Used robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denotes statistically significant at a 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 12, 23 and 34 next to exp and 
rev refer to the relevant value for , according to (6). 
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